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Introduction

The usual approach to economic analysis is to ask how assumptions about exogenous variables—i.e., technology and agents’ preferences—translate into implications for endogenous
variables—i.e., agents’ choices. But when there is uncertainty, agents’ choices also depend
on their information. When many agents interact strategically, agents’ information about
others agents’ information, and higher-order information, will also matter. The usual approach is to also treat the type space, or the structure of information, as known. However,
an alternative approach is to see what predictions can be made about agents’ choices while
being agnostic about agents’ information. Bergemann and Morris (2013, 2016) have pursued
this approach and report a characterization (“Bayes correlated equilibrium” (BCE)) of the
set of outcomes that may arise without making assumptions about the type space.
The usual approach to identification reverses this problem. Given observed endogenous
variables (agents’ choices), what can we infer about about structural parameters (technology
and agents’ preferences)? The usual identification exercise is carried out under the assumption of a known type space. However, the type space is often not known. It is therefore
natural to ask what partial identification is possible using the BCE characterization of possible outcomes. The possibility of such partial identification has been discussed in Bergemann
and Morris (2013) and Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris (2017). This partial identification
has been implemented and used to develop counterfactual implications in Magnolfi and Roncoroni (2017) and Syrgkanis, Tamer, and Ziani (2017). In particular, these papers partially
identify structural parameters from the data using the BCE characterization, and then ask
what BCE could have arisen with that partially identified set in an alternative game. Thus,
they assume that structural parameters stay the same in the counterfactual but make no
assumption about information. We might call this “counterfactuals with latent and variable
information” since it is assumed that the econometrician does not know the type space and
the information in the counterfactual is allowed to be different from the information that
generated the data.
In this paper, we describe an alternative approach—“counterfactuals with latent and fixed
information”—where we continue to assume that the econometrician knows nothing about
the type space, but we ask what would have happened if we changed the payoffs but kept
the information the same. This corresponds to the classical counterfactual exercise of asking
what happens if we change one variable but leave everything else the same.
A potential problem with this approach (not present in the variable information approach)
is that the space of type spaces is a complex object. In a single-agent context, information
can be canonically represented as a distribution over distributions over states, which is an
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infinite dimensional vector space even when the number of states is finite. In the multiagent context, it is canonically represented as a distribution over belief hierarchies in the
universal type space. Given the high dimensionality of information, a common approach is
to assume a particular functional form, e.g., affiliated private values in the context of auction
models. The dimension reduction then facilitates identification and counterfactuals, at the
cost of additional assumptions which may be more for tractability than realism or economic
substance.
Despite this complexity, we explore a completely non-parametric approach to the (partial)
identification of agents’ information. We cannot escape the high dimensionality of information, and a direct description of the type spaces that rationalize observed behavior—i.e.,
explicit partial identification—would be impractical. Instead, we fix a specific counterfactual that is of interest. We argue that observed behavior can be treated as an implicit
restriction on behavior in the counterfactual economy, so that the counterfactual prediction
remains finite dimensional as long as the underlying action and state spaces are also finite.
Let us give a semi-formal discussion for the special case of a single-agent decision problem.
Suppose that an agent must take an action a from a finite set of possible actions. The action
results in a payoff u (a, θ), where θ is a possibly uncertain state of the world. As θ is uncertain,
so too may be the agent’s information about θ. But we maintain the standard assumption
that the agent’s action maximizes expected utility, given whatever interim beliefs about θ
are held at the time the decision was made.
Over a long period of time or across a large population of such agents, and with suitable
ergodicity assumptions, what may be observable is the distribution of outcomes, e.g., the
actions that were taken. In fact, for the purposes of the current discussion, we can further
suppose that a and θ are both observable ex post, so that the joint distribution thereof,
denoted φ (a, θ) , can be estimated. (We allow very general forms for the data in our main
theorem.) What is not observable is what the agent knew about θ at the time the action
was taken.
This information may be canonically expressed as an experiment in the sense of Blackwell
(1951): the agent observes a signal t, and the distribution of t conditional on θ is known to
follow a conditional probability law π (t|θ). By adding a prior over θ and applying Bayes’ rule,
this experiment will induce a distribution over interim beliefs. An experiment rationalizes
the observed data if an expected utility maximizing agent who observed the signal would
optimally behave in a way that results in the observed distribution φ.
Now suppose we wish to predict how the same agent will behave in a new decision
problem, where an action b
a leads to a payoff u
b (b
a, θ). Importantly, we shall assume that
while the decision problem changes, the distribution of θ and the agent’s information (i.e., the
3

Blackwell experiment) remain the same.1 Note that the distribution of θ can be computed
directly from the joint distribution φ, but the experiment, i.e., the set of signals and the
conditional distribution π, is a latent parameter. The question is which joint distributions
φb (b
a, θ) could be induced by optimal behavior for some experiment which also rationalizes
the observed data φ. This counterfactual prediction can then be used to test a model of
preferences, do welfare analysis, etc.
One approach would be to first compute the set of experiments which can rationalize φ,
and then for each such experiment, compute the optimal strategies and resulting φb in the
counterfactual. But in the Blackwell model, the signals are an abstract set, and we have not
even assumed a particular space in which these signals should live. For single-agent decision
problems, there are canonical signal spaces. For example, an equivalent representation of
the set of experiments is the set of distributions over distributions over θ whose expectation
is the prior. But the space of such distributions is infinite dimensional, and it is not obvious
whether or how it can be approximated with finite structures.
Instead, we propose to skip the identification step and proceed directly to counterfactual
predictions. This can be done as follows. Imagine that rather than performing an abstract
thought experiment, the agent did in fact choose b
a at the same time as a was chosen,
and we simply did not observe it. The agent’s payoffs were simply the sum across the
two decision problems, so that there was no interaction between the two decisions except
through the common information. Moreover, since both actions were taken based on the
same information about the same state, there will be correlation between θ, a, and b
a, and we
a, θ) for the joint distribution of these objects. We could even conceptualize
can write φ (a, b
there being a single doubled decision problem, in which the action is an ordered pair (a, b
a). If
φ is to be consistent with our data, the marginal of φ on (a, θ) must be φ. The counterfactual
prediction φb is simply the marginal of φ on (b
a, θ).
Thus, the problem of computing counterfactual predictions can be reduced to computing
those φ which are consistent with Bayesian rationality. But this problem has already been
solved: The solution concept of Bayes correlated equilibrium (Bergemann and Morris, 2016)
describes precisely those joint distributions of actions and states which are consistent with
optimal behavior with respect to some information, and corresponds to a convex set of φ that
satisfy a finite collection of “obedience constraints,” which represent Bayesian optimality.
When we add in the constraint that the marginal on (a, θ) is the observed φ, we obtain
a convex polytope of joint distributions φ on (a, b
a, θ) which are consistent with rationality
in the doubled decision problem and are consistent with the data. The set of possible
1

The assumption of a constant prior distribution over θ is nearly without loss of generality, see the
discussion in Section 5.
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counterfactual outcomes can then be obtained as the marginals on (b
a, θ). The net result is
that the counterfactual prediction is a convex polytope, which can be described by a finite
collection of linear constraints, as long as the underlying action and state spaces are finite
and the data provides linear restrictions. These constraints can then be used to compute
counterfactual welfare outcomes by simply solving linear programs.
In our main result below, we develop this idea for general games of incomplete information. The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 establishes the basic notation.
Section 3 presents our notion of a counterfactual prediction and our main theorem characterizing the set of counterfactuals consistent with data. Section 4 illustrates our theorem
with three examples showing how holding information fixed tightens predictions relative the
variable information approach used in existing empirical work. Section 5 is a discussion of
the theorem, and Section 6 briefly concludes.

2

Preliminaries

The economy consists of N agents, indexed by i = 1, . . . , N . Agents’ preferences depend on
a state of the world θ ∈ Θ, where Θ is a finite set. The players and state space will be held
fixed throughout our analysis.
The prior distribution over states is denoted µ ∈ ∆ (Θ).
The players interact through a game form, denoted G, which consists of the following
objects. Each player has finite set of actions Ai for each player, with A = ×N
i=1 Ai denoting the
set of action profiles. Players are expected utility maximizers, and preferences are represented
by utility indices ui : A × Θ → R. Thus G = (Ai , ui )N
i=1 .
Players’ information about the state is represented with a common-prior type space,
denoted by T , which consists of the following objects. Each player has a measurable set
of types Ti , with T = ×N
i=1 Ti denoting the set of type profiles, and there is a conditional
probability
measure
π : Θ → ∆ (T ) over type profiles as a function of the state. Thus


N
2
T = (Ti )i=1 , π .
A Bayesian game is a tuple (µ, G, T ). A strategy for player i in the Bayesian game is a
measurable mapping σi : Ti → ∆ (Ai ). We write σi (ai |ti ) for the probability of an action ai
given the type ti . A strategy profile is denoted σ = (σ1 , . . . , σN ), and is associated with the
product mapping σ : T → ∆ (A), where σ (a|t) = ×N
i=1 σi (ai |ti ). Player i’s expected utility
2

Note that we allow the type space to be infinite, while the other objects in the model are finite. This
richness is necessary to accommodate the full range of possible higher order beliefs and to consider the full
range of equilibrium behavior in our counterfactuals.
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under the strategy profile σ is
Ui (σ) =

XZ
θ∈Θ

X

ui (a, θ) σ (a|t) π (dt|θ) µ (θ) .

t∈T a∈A

A strategy profile σ is a Nash equilibrium if Ui (σ) ≥ Ui (σi0 , σ−i ) for all i and for all alternative
strategies σi0 .
An outcome of a Bayesian game is a distribution φ ∈ ∆ (A × Θ). Note that the outcome
contains all the information required in order to compute players’ payoffs or any Bayesian
welfare criterion that only depends on realized actions and states. The outcome φ is induced
by a strategy profile σ in Bayesian game (µ, G, T ) if
Z
φ (a, θ) =

σ (a|t) π (dt|θ) µ (θ) .
t∈T

An outcome φ is a Bayes correlated equilibrium (BCE) of the basic game (µ, G) if the marginal
of φ on Θ is µ, and if the following obedience constraints are satisfied: for all i, ai , and a0i ,
X X

(ui (ai , a−i , θ) − ui (a0i , a−i , θ)) φ (ai , a−i , θ) ≥ 0.

(1)

θ∈Θ a−i ∈A−i

It is a theorem of Bergemann and Morris (2013, 2016) that φ is a BCE of (µ, G) if and only
if there exists a type space T and a Nash equilibrium σ of (µ, G, T ) such that φ is induced
by σ.
We will sometime abuse notation by saying that an outcome φ is a Bayes correlated
equilibrium of the game form G if it is a Bayes correlated equilibrium of the basic game
(µ, G) for some µ.

3

Counterfactuals when Information is Latent and Fixed

We will use the preceding framework to study counterfactual predictions, in which the sets of
possible states, actions and agents’ preferences are assumed to be known, but the distribution
µ, the type space T and the agents’ strategies are latent parameters. In particular, we fix a
state space Θ, and we suppose that the agents interact in two distinct game forms, which we
b We extend
will distinguish as the (partially) observed game G and the unobserved game G.
the convention that objects without accents correspond to the (partially) observed game and
objects accented with a circumflex correspond to the unobserved game. For example, we
b respectively.
denote outcomes for the two games by φ and φ,
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There is data on behavior in the observed game. We want to predict behavior in the
unobserved game. We suppose that the only data that is available, and the only prediction
that is desired, pertains to the outcomes. All we know is that the outcome φ (i) lies in a set
M ⊆ ∆ (A × Θ); (ii) it was generated under some prior µ and type space T , and (iii) it was
induced by a Nash equilibrium

 of (µ, G, T ). We ask which outcomes φ̂ could be induced by
bT ?
some equilibrium of µ, G,


b
b
Formally, an outcome φ ∈ ∆ A × Θ is a counterfactual prediction if there exist µ, T ,


b T , respectively, such that the outcome φ
and Nash equilibria σ and σ
b of (µ, G, T ) and µ, G,
induced by σ is in M and such that φb is induced by σ
b. The set of counterfactual predictions
b (M ), where we emphasize the dependence on the conditions M .
is denoted Φ
There are various possible specifications for M , which represent different kinds of observed
data. For example:
1. M = {φ} for some particular φ. This corresponds to the case described in the introduction, where the joint distribution of states and actions is known. It is only the
information that we wish to identify from the data.
2. M = {φ ∈ ∆ (A × Θ) |margA φ = ψ} for some ψ ∈ ∆ (A). In this case, the joint distribution of actions is known, but both information and the distribution of θ are latent
variables.
3. M = {φ ∈ ∆ (A × Θ) |margA φ ∈ Ψ} for some Ψ ⊆ ∆ (A). In this case, we do not even
observe the entire distribution of the players’ actions. For example, it could be that
only some statistic, such as the average action or the highest action is observed.
b (M ). We denote by Ḡ the following
Our main result is the following characterization of Φ
bi , and preferences are represented by
doubled game, where player i’s actions are Ai = Ai × A
ui (a, θ) = ui (a, θ) + u
bi (b
a, θ) ,
where ai = (ai , b
ai ) for all i.3
3

Aumann and Dreze (2008) use the term “doubled game” to refer to an artificial game where we introduce
two copies of each player’s action and use the correlated equilibria of this artificial game to characterize the set
of interim payoffs consistent with the common knowledge of rationality and the common prior assumptions
in the play of a complete information. Our doubled game has instead has players choosing actions from
each of two games, but, like Aumann and Dreze (2008), uses the (Bayes) correlated equilibria as a device
to answer a novel substantive economic question, in this case characterizing counterfactuals. Aumann and
Dreze (2008) use the term “doubled game” to refer to an artificial game where we introduce two copies of
each player’s action and use the correlated equilibria of this artificial game to characterize the set of interim
payoffs consistent with the common knowledge of rationality and the common prior assumptions in the play
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We refer to G and Gb as the component games. Note that a Bayes
correlated

 equilibrium

b×Θ .
φ of Θ, µ, G, T can be identified with a joint distribution in ∆ A × A
Theorem 1 (Counterfactual Predictions).
b (M ) if and only if there exists a Bayes correlated equilibrium φ of G
An outcome φ̂ is in Φ
b × Θ.
for which (i) the marginal of φ on A × Θ is in M and (ii) φb is the marginal of φ on A
Proof of Theorem 1. Fix a type space T . Any strategy profile σ in the doubled game can
be identified with a pair of strategy profiles σ and σ
b in the observed and unobserved game,
bi .
where σi (·|ti ) is the marginal of σ (·, ·|ti ) on Ai and σ
bi (·|ti ) is the marginal on A

Claim: σ̄ is a Nashequilibrium of µ, G, T if and only if σ and σ
b are Nash equilibria of
b T , respectively. This follows from the identity
(µ, G, T ) and µ, G,
U i (σ) =

XZ
θ∈Θ

=

X

t∈T

XZ
θ∈Θ

t∈T

ūi (a, θ) σ (a|t) π (dt|θ) µ (θ) .

a∈A



X
X

ui (a, θ) σ (a|t) +
u
bi (b
a, θ) σ
b (b
a|t) π (dt|θ) µ (θ)
a∈A

b
b
a∈A

bi (b
= Ui (σ) + U
σ) .
Thus, if σ̄ is not a Nash equilibrium, then there exists σ̄i0 , which is associated with marginal
strategies σi0 and σ
bi0 , such that
bi (b
Ui (σ) + U
σ ) = U i (σ)
< U i (σ 0 , σ −i )
bi (b
= Ui (σi0 , σ−i ) + U
σi0 , σ
b−i ) ,
so that at least one of σi0 or σ
bi0 must be a profitable deviation. Similarly, if there is a profitable
deviation in one of the component games, say to σi0 for player i in the observed game, then
0
the product strategy defined by σ i (ai , b
ai |ti ) = σi0 (ai |ti ) σ
bi (b
ai |ti ) is a profitable deviation in
the doubled game.
With the claim in hand, we now prove the if direction of the theorem. As is known, φ is a
Bayes correlated equilibrium of the game form Ḡ if and only if there exists a µ, T , and Nash

equilibrium σ of µ, G, T that induces φ. As a result, the marginal strategies σ and σ
b of σ
are also Nash equilibria of the component games. Moreover, they induce Bayes correlated
of a complete information. Our doubled game has instead has players choosing actions from each of two
games, but, like Aumann and Dreze (2008), uses the (Bayes) correlated equilibria as a device to answer a
novel substantive economic question, in this case characterizing counterfactuals.
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b which are simply marginals of φ. Thus, if the marginal of φ on A × Θ is
equilibria φ and φ,
b (M ).
in M , then φ is in M , so that φb ∈ Φ
Now the only if direction. If for some µ and T there are Nash equilibria σ and σ
b,
b respectively, then the latter is in Φ
b (M ). Then the
which induce outcomes φ ∈ M and φ,
aforementioned product strategy σ of σ and σ
b is a Nash equilibrium of the doubled game, and
b This completes
it induces an Bayes correlated equilibrium φ whose marginals are φ and φ.
the proof.
A leading case is when M is a polytope, i.e., the set of outcomes that satisfy a finite
number of linear inequalities. For example, this is the case when M = {φ}, so that states
and actions are observed, or when M = {ψ} × ∆ (Θ), so that actions are observed and states
b (M ) is also a polytope, namely the projection of the
are not. When M is a polytope, then Φ
set of BCE of the doubled game which satisfy the finitely many obedience constraints (1),
one for each (ai , b
ai ), and the marginal constraints corresponding to M . This is still a finite
dimensional set, although the dimension grows exponentially in the number of players. If
we fix a Bayesian welfare criterion w (b
a, θ) over ex post counterfactual outcomes, then the
range of expected values of w across all counterfactuals can be obtained by solving a pair
of finite dimensional linear programming problems. We will use this fact in the examples in
the next section.

4

Three Examples

We now present three examples to illustrate the content of our theorem. In order to focus
on the logic of our approach, our examples all concern the case where the distribution over
fundamentals is revealed by the data and the interesting question is how the data constrains
information in the counterfactual. Our examples show that fixing the information structure
dramatically reduces the set of possible counterfactuals, relative to a variable information
approach. We leave for future work the question of how holding the information structures
reduces the set of possible counterfactuals in more realistic empirical settings where the
distribution of fundamentals is also not known.

4.1

Single Agent

Let us begin with a single-agent decision problem. This is the special case we discussed in
the Introduction. The possible states are Θ = {0, 1}, and both states are equally likely. The
set of actions is similarly A = {0, 1}. In the observed single-agent game, the agent gets a
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payoff of 1 if and only if the action matches the state, 0 otherwise:

u (a, θ) =


1

if a = θ;

0

otherwise.

In the counterfactual game, the agent gets a payoff of 2 − z from matching state 0, and a
payoff of z from matching state 1, where z ∈ [0, 2]:



2−z


û (a, θ) = z



0

if a = θ = 0;
if a = θ = 1;
otherwise.

Thus, in both games, the agent wants to match the state, and z controls the relative value of
matching state 0 versus state 1 in the counterfactual. The parameter value z = 1 corresponds
to the observed game. If the agent knew the state perfectly, then we would see a = b
a=θ
with probability one and a payoff of 1 (in both observed and counterfactual games). If the
agent knew nothing about the state, then the agent strictly prefers b
a = 0 if z < 1, strictly
prefers b
a = 1 if z > 1, and is indifferent at z = 1. The payoff under no information is
therefore max {(2 − z) /2, z/2}.
We suppose that the joint distribution of (a, θ) is perfectly observed and is given by the
symmetric distribution:

φ (a, θ) =


1α

if a = θ;

1 − α
2

if a 6= θ.

2

Note that we must have α ∈ [1/2, 1]: if α < 1/2, the agent could achieve a higher average
payoff in the observed game by picking one action and playing it all the time.
We ask, what are the possible payoffs for the agent in the counterfactual game? First,
consider what counterfactual predictions we can make if we allow information to be different in the counterfactual. Then the only thing we can learn from the data is that both
states are equally likely, and thus α contains no useful information. Since welfare in singleagent decision problems is monotonically increasing in the Blackwell order, we know that
full information and no information achieve the maximum and minimum possible payoffs,
respectively. Intermediate information must result in a payoff between these bounds. There
is no more we can say. These are the highest and lowest solid lines in Figure 1.
Next, consider what happens if we hold information fixed. We compute the convex set
of possible counterfactual welfare outcomes for various values of α and z. The results are
10

Figure 1: Counterfactual welfare in the binary example.
plotted in Figure 1. Suppose first that z = 1, so that the observed and unobserved decision
problems are the same. This is a kind of “local” counterfactual exercise. In this case, there is
a point prediction for welfare. In fact, it is the same welfare as in the observed game. Why?
The agent has the option to use information the same way in the counterfactual game as
in the observed game, and guarantee a weakly higher payoff. A symmetric argument says
that observed welfare must be at least the counterfactual welfare, so the two are equal. But
observed welfare is known exactly from φ.
Now consider z 6= 1. When α = 0.5, there is a point prediction for all z, given by the topmost line in Figure 1. For in this case, observed actions and states are perfectly correlated.
This is only feasible if the agent learns the state perfectly. Then in any counterfactual, since
the agent knows the state and prefers to match, we must see that states and actions are
still perfectly correlated, and the agent achieves the optimal payoff of 1. Similarly, when
α = 0.25, observed actions and states are uncorrelated, which can only be rationalized by
the agent having no information. In the counterfactual, the agent can do no better than
play a pure action, which results in the minimum payoff of max {(2 − z) /2, z/2}.
The counterfactual prediction for the intermediate case of α = 0.375 is the interval
between the dashed lines (the lower dashed line coincides with the no-information prediction
for z that are close to either 0 or 1). There is generally a fat set of welfare outcomes, except
for z ∈ {0, 1, 2}. The reason is that there is a range of information structures that can
rationalize the agent’s behavior, and these have different implications in the counterfactual.
Here are two possible explanations for the fact that the agent guesses the state correctly 3/4
of the time:

11

(a) Half of the time, the agent perfectly learns the state and plays the correct action all
the time, and the other half of the time, the agent learns nothing and randomizes with
equal probabilities.
(b) With probability one, the agent gets a noisy observation of the state that is correct
with probability 3/4, and the agent plays an action equal to the realized signal.
Both of these experiments rationalize the data, but they have different implications for the
counterfactual. In fact, they attain the numerically computed bounds. With information as
in (a), the optimal strategy is to match the state when it is revealed, attaining 1, and to
play the optimal pure action when the state is not revealed, attaining max {(2 − z) /2, z/2}.
The average of these two yields the upper bound. With information as in (b), as long as z
is close to 1, it is still optimal to play the action equal to the signal. But for extreme z, it
becomes better to play a pure action, thus giving the payoff of max {(2 − z) /2, z/2}.
The takeaway from this example is that information can have a great deal of predictive
power in single-agent counterfactual analysis, especially when the counterfactual environment
does not differ too much from the one that was observed. In fact, the tightness of the
prediction in local counterfactuals, and the gap between fixed and variable information, will
be true in any single-agent decision problem. We summarize this observation in the following
result:
Proposition 1 (Single-Agent Counterfactuals).
Consider a single-agent decision problem where the agent’s observed payoff is u. If the counterfactual and observed decision problems are the same, then under fixed information, there
is point identification of the agent’s counterfactual payoffs, which must be u. Under variable
information, then a tight upper bound on the agent’s payoff is given by what is attained under
full information, and a tight lower bound is what is attained with no information.
In the next two examples, we show how the same basic idea can be applied to multi-agent
games where not just beliefs about θ but also higher order beliefs are implicitly identified in
the process of making counterfactual predictions.

4.2

Two-Player Zero-Sum

We now consider a setting with two players, binary actions, and binary states. The observed
game is the following:

12

θ=0
a1 /a2
0
1

0
(2, −2)
(−1, 1)

θ=1
a1 /a2
0
1

1
(−1, 1)
(0, 0)

0
(0, 0)
(−1, 1)

1
(−1, 1)
(2, −2)

In each state, the game has the form of an asymmetric matching pennies. Both states are
equally likely, so that in expectation the game is symmetric. Thus, if the players have no
information about the state, there is a unique equilibrium in which they both randomize
with equal probabilities, and both players’ payoffs are zero. If they have full information
about the state, then there is again a unique (and symmetric) equilibrium in which they
play a = 0 with probability 1/4 in state θ = 0, and they play a = 0 with probability 3/4 in
state θ = 1. In both states, player 1’s payoff is −1/4.
We assume that we have observed φ exactly, and φ (a, θ) = 1/8 for all (a, θ). This
is the joint distribution of states and actions that arises under no information. In the
counterfactual, we multiply all of the payoffs by a factor 2 − z in state 0 and by z in state
1, for some z ∈ [0, 2]. The observed game corresponds to z = 1. Since the game is zero sum,
the only counterfactual outcome of interest is player 1’s payoff.
We numerically computed maximum and minimum payoffs for player 1 for a fine grid
of z values. The range of counterfactual outcomes under variable and fixed information are
depicted in Figure 2 as a function of z. When information is variable, then again, the only
thing we learn from the data is that both states are equally likely. The gray lines represent
upper and lower bounds on welfare. The range of possible outcomes is largest at z = 1, when
the counterfactual game is a copy of the observed game. In this case, any payoff in [−1/2, 1/2]
can be attained with some type space. The highest payoff of 1/2 can be achieved by letting
player 1 observe the state and player 2 receiving no information. Under that information,
there is an equilibrium where b
a1 = θ and player 2 mixes with equal probabilities. Similarly,
the payoff of −1/2 can be achieved by giving no information to player 1 and full information
to player 2. In fact, it is a result of Peski (2008) that these are the type spaces that achieve
extreme welfare outcomes in any two-player zero-sum game, and it is not particular to our
example.4
4

Here is essence of the proof. Player 1’s payoff in (M, T ) is at least his maxmin payoff, where the max
and min are taken over player 1 and player 2’s strategies, respectively. Player 2 has the option to use a
strategy that does not depend on his private information t2 , so player 1’s maxmin payoff would increase if we
restricted player 2 to use only those constant strategies. This is what happens if player 2 has no information.
Next, if we look at type spaces where only player 1 gets information, then it must be that player 1’s payoff
is maximized by having as much information is possible. For any strategy under partial information can be
replicated under full information simply by “simulating” the noisy signal, so the effective strategy space is
largest under full information. Finally, this maxmin is only a lower bound on player 1’s payoff. But in the
extreme case of full info/no info, the bound is clearly unimprovable, since the game is finite so an equilibrium
exists, which must have a value equal to the maxmin (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994, Proposition 22.2).
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Figure 2: Counterfactual payoffs for player 1 in the zero-sum game.
Note that when z = 0 or z = 1, then payoffs are zero in one state, so that it is effectively a
game with a single state, and thus the value of the game is uniquely pinned down independent
of the information.
When we fix information, the range of counterfactual outcomes is tighter. Indeed, when
z = 1, there is a unique counterfactual prediction when the counterfactual game coincides
with the observed game. Once again, this is a general insight that is not particular to our
example. In any two-player zero-sum game, if there is a type space T and equilibrium σ
that rationalizes the observed actions and in which player 1’s payoff is u1 , then it must be
that the zero-sum game (µ, G, T ) has a value which is u1 , and hence all equilibria have the
same payoffs. This observation completes an analogue of Proposition 1 for zero-sum games:
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Proposition 2 (Two-player zero-sum counterfactuals).
Consider a two-player zero-sum game in which players’ observed payoffs are (u1 , −u1 ). If the
counterfactual and observed games are the same, then under fixed information, there is point
identification of the players counterfactual payoffs, which must be (u1 , −u1 ). Under variable
information, then a tight upper bound on player 1’s payoff is given by what is attained when
player 1 has full information and player 2 has no information, and a tight lower bound is
what is attained when player 1 has no information and player 2 has full information.
Thus, it is a general phenomenon that there are point predictions for local counterfactuals
in two-player zero-sum games under fixed information, although there is generally a fat set
of counterfactual predictions under variable information.
Returning now to the particular example, as z moves away from 1, the range of counterfactual payoffs expands, before contracting again as we approach the complete information
extremes. Thus, the predictive power of fixed information is large when the counterfactual
is closed to the observed game, but that predictive power degrades as the counterfactual
environment diverges from that which generated the data.
The broad economic conclusion is that player 1 prefers moderate z, while player 2 prefers
extreme values.5 Specifically, when information is fixed and |z − 1| > 0.58, then we can
unambiguously say that player 1 is worse off and player 2 is better off in the counterfactual
than in the observed game. When |z − 1| ≤ 0.58, then the change in welfare is ambiguous:
player 1 may be better off or worse off, depending on the true type space. A similar statement
applies when information is variable, but the conditions for player 1 to be better off are more
stringent, and we can unambiguously sign the change in welfare only when |z − 1| > 2/3.

4.3

Entry

For our last example, we consider a simple entry game. Two firms choose whether or not to
enter a market. The firms that enter compete in quantities and face the downward sloping
demand curve P = max {θ − Q}, where P is the market price, Q is aggregate output, and
θ ∈ Θ = {1, 2, 3} is an unknown state of demand. All demand intercepts are equally likely.
Production cost is zero, but there is a fixed cost F ≥ 0 to enter the market.6
5

As we discuss further in Section 5, an equivalent interpretation is that if we hold z = 1 fixed and vary
the prior µ, then player 1 prefers large uncertainty about θ (µ (θ) close to 1/2 for both θ) and player 2 prefers
small uncertainty (µ (θ) close to either 0 or 1).
6
Note that the uncertainty here is about a common demand shock, and firms have complete information
about the symmetric entry cost. In the entry games analyzed in much of the literature, e.g., Ciliberto and
Tamer (2009) and Magnolfi and Roncoroni (2017), the uncertainty is about firms’ entry costs, which are
privately known. Our example is chosen for its simplicity, but private entry costs can easily be incorporated
into our framework, as we discuss in Section 5.
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If no firms enter, both firms’ profits, consumer surplus, and total welfare are all zero.
If one firm enters, the monopoly outcome obtains, in which the entering firm sets qi = θ/2,
the market price is θ/2, the entering firm’s profit is θ2 /4 − F , the firm that does not enter
has a payoff of 0, consumer surplus is θ2 /8, and total welfare is 3θ2 /8 − F .
If two firms enter, there the subgame has a unique equilibrium in which q1 = q2 = θ/3,
the market price is P = θ/3, both firms earn profits θ2 /9 − F , consumer surplus is 4θ2 /9,
and total welfare is 2θ2 /3 − 2F . We assume that this equilibrium is played in the event that
both firms enter, which is essentially imposing sequential rationality.
We assume that F = 3/4 in the observed game. As a result, it is profitable for one or two
firms to enter when θ = 3, it is profitable for one but not two firms to enter when θ = 2, and
it is unprofitable for any firms to enter when θ = 1. We again assume that φ is observed, and
has the following form: Both firms enter when θ = 2; exactly one firm enters when θ = 2,
and both are equally likely to be the entering firm; and no firms enter when θ = 1. Each
firm’s observed profit is 1/8, observed consumer surplus is 3/2, and observed total welfare
is 7/4. This outcome is consistent with the firms having complete information about θ, and
playing a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium when θ = 2.
We numerically computed maximum and minimum welfare, consumer surplus, and profit,
for a range of counterfactual entry fees between 0 and 5/2. The results are depicted in Figure
3. Once again, we have included the benchmark of variable information to see how the bounds
improve when we impose fixed information in the counterfactual.
Note that if F > 9/4, then it is unprofitable to enter even as a monopolist in the best
state, so that all outcomes must be zero irrespective of information. Similarly, if F < 1/9,
then it is profitable to enter even if θ = 1 and there is another firm already in the market,
so that both firms always enter and there is again a point prediction for welfare, in both the
fixed and variable information regimes.
For F ∈ [1/9, 9/4], there is generally a fat set of welfare outcomes, even for fixed information. This is true even when the counterfactual entry cost is 3/4, i.e., the counterfactual game
is the same as the observed game. This is at least partly due to the fact that the entry game
generally has multiple equilibria which are not payoff equivalent. For example, even under
complete information (which is one way to rationalize the data), there are pure strategy equilibria which could generate the data, but there is also a mixed strategy equilibrium in which
the firms enter when θ = 2 with independent probabilities. Our counterfactual prediction
ranges over all equilibria, and hence there will be multiple counterfactual welfare outcomes.
This kind of multiplicity is similar to that which arises in the literature on entry games with
unknown equilibrium selection, such as Ciliberto and Tamer (2009). Our methodology gives
rise to an additional source of multiplicity, which is that we implicitly give players access
16

Figure 3: Counterfactual welfare in the entry game.
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to rich correlating devices. Thus, even in a complete information game, our counterfactual
prediction would range over all correlated equilibria, as well as Nash equilibria. This also
occurs in Magnolfi and Roncoroni (2017) and Syrgkanis, Tamer, and Ziani (2017).
Even so, the counterfactual prediction is far from vacuous. For example, we may ask, how
low does the entry fee have to go before we are certain that total welfare will be higher than
what we observed? Under fixed information, the answer is that if F < 0.54, then expected
welfare must be at least 7/4 in all equilibria and in all type spaces that can rationalize the
data, where 7/4 is total welfare in the hypothetical data. If we allowed information to vary,
the corresponding threshold is 0.41. Similarly, if the entry fee rose above 0.81, then total
welfare must unambiguously fall, regardless of the type space or equilibrium. This number
is the same whether we hold information fixed or allow it to vary.

5

Discussion

We shall now conclude with a discussion of Theorem 1 and some possible extensions.

5.1

Complexity and the Partially Identified Set

As we mentioned in the introduction, it is important to note that while these counterfactual
exercises are finite dimension, the latent parameter of the type space is infinite dimensional.
Indeed, we have not even specified a particular space in which the types live, so we cannot
even construct a “set of all type spaces” that rationalize the data.7 Nonetheless, in the singleagent case, all that matters for behavior is the agent’s interim beliefs about θ. We could
without loss of generality restrict attention to type spaces in which T = ∆ (Θ) and the types
are normalized to be equal to the interim belief. Even so, the agent’s interim belief may have
full support on ∆ (Θ), which is an infinite dimensional vector space. No finite approximation
can capture all of the relevant behavior, in that for any two distinct distribution of beliefs,
we can always find a game for which counterfactual predictions would differ across the two
distributions. However, if Θ is separable, then ∆ (Θ) is a separable metric space in the weak-∗
topology, and behavior in single-agent decision problems with continuous utilities can be well
approximated in this topology. We could in principle compute the set of rationalizing type
spaces whose support lives in a finite grid in ∆ (Θ) and presumably have a fair approximation
of behavior in counterfactual games.
7

This would be a bit like a “set of all sets.” If a set of all type spaces can be constructed, does it contain
a type space whose types are the type spaces which are not types in themselves?
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In the multi-agent case, the canonical space for types is the universal type space (Brandenburger and Dekel, 1993; Mertens and Zamir, 1985). This is also an infinite-dimensional
vector space, and much of our comments about the single-agent case apply here as well. A
qualitative difference is that types in the universal type space are much harder to approximate. For example, the set of “finite” types, which correspond to belief hierarchies that arise
in finite type spaces, is dense in the universal type space in the product topology. Finite
types, however, do not provide a good approximation of behavior, in the sense that rationalizable behavior along a sequence of finite types may not be close to rationalizable behavior
for the limit type (Rubinstein, 1989; Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris, 2006). We see no simple
way to even approximately compute the set of type spaces that rationalize multi-agent outcomes. Moreover, the universal type space only encodes agents’ higher order beliefs about
the state, and it abstracts away from correlation devices which may be relevant for strategic
interaction (cf. Liu, 2015). This makes our “implicit identification” methodology all the more
appealing.

5.2

Counterfactuals when Information is Latent and Variable

As we briefly mentioned in the introduction, Magnolfi and Roncoroni (2017) and Syrgkanis, Tamer, and Ziani (2017) also uses BCE for partial identification and counterfactual
prediction. Translated to our language, they partially identify the prior distribution µ, the
distribution over states, which is in turn used for counterfactual prediction. They do not,
however, use the information revealed about the type space in the counterfactual. This
makes their counterfactual predictions more robust. But if we take the usual meaning of
“counterfactual”—what would have happened if we had changed an aspect of the game, leaving everything else fixed—it is not clear why one would want to allow the information to
change. Because we hold the type space fixed, our counterfactual prediction is necessarily
tighter.
One way of contrasting the approaches is consider the case where µ is known. Our fixed
information approach is still useful, since data reveals information about the type space that
can be used to narrow down predictions in the counterfactual. In the variable information
approach, data from the first problem does not restrict behavior in the counterfactual. We
illustrated this case in our examples in the previous section.
It remains true in the variable information case that it is not necessary to be explicit about
the partial identification of the prior distribution µ. Identifying counterfactuals reduces
to solving a linear programming problem. However, if we are only interested in partially
identifying µ, the partially identified set is itself a finite-dimensional polytope. In this sense,
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the computational advantage of bypassing explicit partial identification is less significant in
the variable information case.

5.3

Nominal Assumptions that are Without Loss of Generality

Our model assumes a great deal of structure on the environment. These assumptions are
considerably weaker than they appear at first glance. We discuss them in turn.
1. All agents receive signals from the same type space. In practice, agents with different
characteristics, in different locations, or different points in time may receive qualitatively different forms of information. We may, however, consider these to be variations
of “representative” information, where the heterogeneity in information is encoded as
an extra dimension of signal. For example, suppose that for each k = 1, . . . , K, a
fraction βk ∈ [0, 1] of the data is generated when the agents have common knowledge

that the type space is T k = T1k , . . . , Tnk , π k . We could equivalently represent this
k
economy with a new type space in which Ti = ∪K
k=1 {k} × Ti , i.e., each player’s set of
types is a disjoint union of the k type spaces, and

β π k (Y |θ)
k
π (X|θ) =
0

if X = {k} × Y for some k;
otherwise.

In words, with probability one, all agents get signals in the same T k , and each k has
probability βk . Our counterfactual prediction implicitly allows for type spaces of this
form.
2. The utility functions ui (a, θ) are known to the analyst. Uncertainty about preferences
can be incorporated by expanding the state space. For example, suppose we start
with a state space Θ, a moment restriction M = {φ (a, θ)}, and two possible utility
functions u1 and u2 . Then we can expand the state space to Θ̃ = {1, 2} × Θ, utility
function u (a, (k, θ)) = uk (a, θ), and the moment restriction is
(
M=



 X
φ̃ ∈ ∆ A × Θ̃
φ̃ (a, (k, θ)) = φ (a, θ)

)
.

k=1,2

Thus, the prevalence of u1 and u2 in the population is a free variable, and is partially
identified from the data.
3. The distribution over states µ is held fixed in the counterfactual. In fact, we can allow
a different distribution µ̂ in the counterfactual, as long as it is absolutely continuous
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with respect to µ, meaning that it can be written as µ̂ (θ) = η (θ) µ (θ) for some
η : Θ → R+ . For example, when we are only interested in varying the prior and the
absolute continuity hypothesis is satisfied, then we can set the counterfactual utility
to ûi (a, θ) = η (θ) ui (a, θ), in which case equilibrium utility is simply
XZ
θ∈Θ

X

µ (θ) ûi (a, θ) σ (a|t) π (dt|θ) =

t∈T a∈A

XZ
θ∈Θ

=

η (θ) µ (θ) ui (a, θ) σ (a|t) π (dt|θ)

t∈T a∈A

XZ
θ∈Θ

X
X

µ̂ (θ) ui (a, θ) σ (a|t) π (dt|θ) ,

t∈T a∈A

and the represented payoffs are equivalent to those that would obtain with the different
prior. This is merely a reflection of the well-known indeterminacy of probabilities versus
utilities in the subjective expected utility model, when utilities are state dependent
(Savage, 1954; Anscombe and Aumann, 1963). Indeed, this transformation was being
used in the single-agent and zero-sum counterfactuals of Sections 4.1 and 4.2, which
can be reinterpreted as variations of the prior.
4. All agents play the same equilibria of the observed and counterfactual games. This is
also without loss of generality. Suppose that the type space is T , and a share βk of
the data is generated from agents who play strategies σ k for k = 1, . . . , K. The same
outcome can be induced with a single type space T̃ , in which T̃i = {1, . . . , K} × Ti ,
π̃ ({k} × X|θ) = βk π (X|θ), and strategies are σ̃i (a| (k, t)) = σik (a|t). In effect, the
first coordinate of the new signal t̃i is a public randomization device which is equal to
k with probability βk . Strategies on the larger space say to play σ k when X = k.
5. There is a single data source, from the game G. In practice, there could be more than
one game form for which we have data. This could be easily incorporated into the
framework by expanding the “doubled” game into a “K + 1-tupled” game, where the
first K games correspond to observed outcomes, and the K +1−th game is the counterfactual. The key feature would be that payoffs are additively separable across games,
although there is no harm in imposing correlation in outcomes across the observed
games.

5.4

Bounds on Information

As in Bergemann and Morris (2013, 2016), we may also consider counterfactual predictions
under stronger assumptions about what information is available to the agents. For example,
in an auction setting, we may wish to impose that each bidder knows their own value for the
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good being sold but has only partial information, of an unknown form, about others’ values
and information.
More broadly, we may suppose that the type space is at least as informative as some T ,
in the sense described in Bergemann and Morris (2016). That paper gives a richer definition
of BCE with respect to T , which is essentially a joint distribution in ∆ (A × T × Θ), where
T is the set of minimal signal profiles, such that for each i and (ai , ti ), ai is a best response to
the conditional distribution of (a−i , θ) given (ai , ti ). Returning to the private value auctions
example, we could take Θ = RN , the set of value profiles, T i = R, where π (·|v) puts
probability one on t = v, so that each bidder’s type is equal to their value. This is the
structure imposed in Syrgkanis, Tamer, and Ziani (2017). Magnolfi and Roncoroni (2017)
use a similar structure, where agent i’s coordinate is interpreted as a private cost of entering
a market. We can incorporate such a lower bound on information into our counterfactual
prediction by simply requiring that φ be a BCE of the doubled game with respect to T .
The proof of our theorem can be replicated almost verbatim with the minor modification of
integrating over types in T .
Ideally, one would like to incorporate upper bounds on information as well, for example,
imposing that players are not too informed about the state. This could either take the form
“the type space T is not at least as informative as T ” or “the type space T is at least as
informative as T .” Unfortunately, we know of no simple way to incorporate such restrictions
while preserving the linear structure and low dimensionality of the counterfactual. It is
possible, however, to incorporate upper bounds on information in the form of conjectures
about how agents will behave in certain situations. For example, we could reinterpret the
single-agent example of Section 4.1 as follows. There is no data, and no observation. There
is only a conjecture that if the agent were to play the game with z = 1, he or she would
guess the state correctly with a probability α. This represents both a lower bound on
information (the agent knows enough about θ to be correct with probability at least α) and
an upper bound on information (the agent does not know so much about θ to be correct with
probability greater than α). We could have instead dropped the former assumption and set
M to be the set of outcomes such that the agent is correct with probability no greater than α.
Our counterfactual predictions would then respect a crude upper bound on information. By
expanding on this idea, it is possible to generate fairly flexible upper bounds on information,
e.g., in the auction context, one could impose that bidders are unable to guess others’ values
with a high degree of accuracy. In light of our point above about having multiple data
sources, there is no conceptual difficulty in combining multiple such conjectures with data
sources.
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6

Conclusion

The purpose of this paper has been to describe exactly the implications of Bayesian rationality and common priors for counterfactual predictions, under the hypothesis that information
is fixed. We have shown that there is a sharp description of the set of counterfactual outcomes that are consistent with observed data. We have demonstrated through examples that
the predictive power of fixed information can be quite large, especially compared to what
can be predicted if we do not fix information between observation and counterfactual.
It is easy to think of reasons why information should not be held fixed in a counterfactual. Economic agents can often influence the kind of information they receive, and why
should information gathering behavior remain the same when other aspects of the world
have changed? Nonetheless, the fixed information benchmark is a useful starting point,
and it is implicitly adopted in much of the extant literature on counterfactuals in industrial
organization (e.g., Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong, 2000; Ciliberto and Tamer, 2009).
The main virtue of our methodology is that it adopts weak assumptions about the form of
information and equilibrium selection. The predictions of our model are therefore quite safe,
although the range of counterfactual outcomes may be larger than what would be obtained
with a more structural model. The suitability of our approach to any particular application
therefore depends both on the analyst’s uncertainty about the form of agents’ information
and preferences with regard to the misspecification thereof.
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